Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Mechanism design (33)
- Asymptotic size (26)
- Bayes correlated equilibrium (25)
- Incomplete information (25)
- Unit root (25)
-
- Adverse selection (24)
- Information structure (24)
- Test (24)
- Climate change (23)
- Cointegration (22)
- Identification (22)
- Asymptotics (21)
- Default (21)
- Moment inequalities (21)
- Nonstationarity (21)
- Confidence set (20)
- Productivity (20)
- Asymptotic theory (19)
- Robustness (19)
- Autoregression (18)
- Common knowledge (18)
- Game theory (18)
- Moral hazard (18)
- Weak instruments (18)
- Brownian motion (17)
- Correlated equilibrium (17)
- General equilibrium (17)
- Long memory (17)
- Unit roots (17)
- Experimentation (16)
- Publication Year
Articles 2131 - 2160 of 2768
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Naval Procurement Problems: Theory And Practice, Zvi A. Livne, Martin Shubik
Naval Procurement Problems: Theory And Practice, Zvi A. Livne, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Small Sample Distribution Theory In Econometric Models Of Simultaneous Equations, Peter C.B. Phillips
Small Sample Distribution Theory In Econometric Models Of Simultaneous Equations, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Cores Of Partitioning Games, Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Cores Of Partitioning Games, Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N of players, there is an a priori given subset pi of coalitions of N and only coalitions in pi play an essential role. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the cores of all games with essential coalitions pi are developed. These conditions appear extremely restrictive. However, when N is “large,” there are relatively few “types” of players, and members of pi are “small” and defined in terms of numbers of players of each type contained in subsets, then approximate cores are non-empty.
Macroeconomics And Fiscal Policy: Paul A. Samuelson And Modern Economics, James Tobin
Macroeconomics And Fiscal Policy: Paul A. Samuelson And Modern Economics, James Tobin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Approximate Cores Of A General Class Of Economies. Part I: Replica Games, Externalities, And Approximate Cores, Martin Shubik, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Approximate Cores Of A General Class Of Economies. Part I: Replica Games, Externalities, And Approximate Cores, Martin Shubik, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Sufficient conditions are demonstrated for the non-emptiness of asymptotic cores of sequences of replica games, i.e., for all sufficiently large replications, the games have non-empty approximate cores and the approximation can be made arbitrarily “good”. The conditions are simply that the games are superadditive and satisfy a very non-restrictive “per-capita” boundedness assumption (these properties are satisfied by games derived from well-known models of replica economies). It is argued that the results can be applied to a broad class of games derived from economic models, including ones with external economies and diseconomies, indivisibilities and non-convexities. To support this claim, in Part …
Approximate Cores Of A General Class Of Economies: Part Ii. Set-Up Costs And Firm Formation In Coalition Production Economies, Martin Shubik, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Approximate Cores Of A General Class Of Economies: Part Ii. Set-Up Costs And Firm Formation In Coalition Production Economies, Martin Shubik, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A general model of a coalition production economy allowing set-up costs, indivisibilities, and non-convexities is developed. It is shown that for all sufficiently large replications, approximate cores of the economy are non-empty.
How Fast Should We Graze The Global Commons?, William D. Nordhaus
How Fast Should We Graze The Global Commons?, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Unlike the vast preponderance of planets, earth has been bequeathed a hospitable environment in which to thrive. Up to now, man’s activities have affected this environment negligibly. Scientists are becoming convinced, however, that release of carbon dioxide (CO2) from combustion of fossil fuels will lead to a significant modification of the global climate (see Woodwell). How should we think about such a destruction of our heritage? Should it be treated as anathema, like bondage? Or should the pace and extent of use of our global commons be subject to the same reasoned balancing of costs and benefits as other economic …
The Conventionally Stable Sets In Noncooperative Games With Limited Observations: The Application To Monopoly And Oligopoly, Mamoru Kaneko
The Conventionally Stable Sets In Noncooperative Games With Limited Observations: The Application To Monopoly And Oligopoly, Mamoru Kaneko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper applies the theory of the conventionally stable set to monopolistic and oligopolistic markets. A market model with a finite number of producers and a continuum of buyers is presented and then is formulated as a strategic game in which the producers’ strategies are prices and the buyers’ strategies are demands for commodities. It is shown that a conventionally stable set in this game corresponds to a conventionally stable one in a game where the producers are only players but the buyers are treated as a certain kind of demand function. Furthermore, it is shown that the theory of …
Entrepreneurial Abilities And Liabilities In A Model Of Self-Selection, Christophe Chamley
Entrepreneurial Abilities And Liabilities In A Model Of Self-Selection, Christophe Chamley
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Payoffs In Non-Atomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach, Pradeep Dubey, Abraham Neyman
Payoffs In Non-Atomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach, Pradeep Dubey, Abraham Neyman
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
The Epsilon Core Of A Large Game, Myrna Holtz Wooders
The Epsilon Core Of A Large Game, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Sufficient conditions are given for large replica games without side payments to have non-empty approximate cores for all sufficiently large replications. No “balancedness” assumptions are required. The conditions are superadditivity, a very weak boundedness condition, and convexity of the payoff sets. An example is provided to show that under these conditions, the (exact) core well may be empty.
Money And Finance In The Macro-Economic Process, James Tobin
Money And Finance In The Macro-Economic Process, James Tobin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Lecture presented December 8, 1981 at the Stockholm School of Economics in connection with the 1981 Prize for Economic Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel.
Macroconfusion: The Dilemmas Of Economic Policy, William D. Nordhaus
Macroconfusion: The Dilemmas Of Economic Policy, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Marginal Densities Of Instrumental Variable Estimators In The General Single Equation Case, Peter C.B. Phillips
Marginal Densities Of Instrumental Variable Estimators In The General Single Equation Case, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A method of extracting marginal density approximations using the multivariate version of the Laplace formula is given and applied to instrumental variable estimators. Some leading exact distributions are derived for the general single equation case which lead to computable formulae and generalize all known results for marginal densities. These results are related to earlier work by Basmann (1963), Kabe (1964) and Phillips (1980b). Some general issues bearing on the current development of small sample theory and its application in empirical work are discussed in the introduction to the paper.
Game Theory: The Language Of Strategy?, Martin Shubik
Game Theory: The Language Of Strategy?, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Some Remarks On The Folk Theorem In Game Theory, Mamoru Kaneko
Some Remarks On The Folk Theorem In Game Theory, Mamoru Kaneko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.
A New Approach To Small Sample Theory, Peter C.B. Phillips
A New Approach To Small Sample Theory, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
It is argued that an integral part of the process by which the results of small sample theory can be transmitted to the applied econometrician will in the future be played by reliable direct approximation to the sampling and posterior distributions that are of interest in the precise setting of the model and the data set with which the investigator is working. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new technique of approximating distributions which is sufficiently general to be widely used and is developed in very general terms and should be widely applicable in mathematical statistics and …
Economic Policy In The Face Of Declining Productivity Growth, William D. Nordhaus
Economic Policy In The Face Of Declining Productivity Growth, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Asset Markets, General Equilibrium And The Neutrality Of Money, Christophe Chamley, Heracles M. Polemarchakis
Asset Markets, General Equilibrium And The Neutrality Of Money, Christophe Chamley, Heracles M. Polemarchakis
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
When government liabilities (including money) are held in private portfolios only as stores of value, and do not provide additional benefits (as liquidity services), the real variables in an economy with uncertainty are not affected by the government’s trading in assets. There are also policies which alter the money supply through taxes or subsidies, and affect the price of money without changing real variables.
Schumpeterian Dynamics Ii. Technological Progress, Firm Growth And ‘Economic Selection', Katsuhito Iwai
Schumpeterian Dynamics Ii. Technological Progress, Firm Growth And ‘Economic Selection', Katsuhito Iwai
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
The Optimal Progressive Income Tax — The Existence And The Limit Tax Rates, Mamoru Kaneko
The Optimal Progressive Income Tax — The Existence And The Limit Tax Rates, Mamoru Kaneko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The purpose of this paper is to consider the problem of optimal income taxation in the domain of progressive (convex) income tax function. This paper proves the existence of an optimal tax function and that the optimal marginal and average tax rates tend asymptotically to 100 percent as income level becomes arbitrarily high.
The Conventionally Stable Sets In Noncooperative Games With Limited Observations: Definitions And Introductory Arguments, Mamoru Kaneko
The Conventionally Stable Sets In Noncooperative Games With Limited Observations: Definitions And Introductory Arguments, Mamoru Kaneko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper attempts to define a new solution concept for n-person noncooperative games. The idea of the new concept is based on that of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, or more precisely, rather on their interpretation of it which they call “standards of behavior.” This new approach enables us to consider new interesting problems of information. Further this approach gives us a plausible interpretation of Nash equilibrium. This paper provides the definition and considers the new solution concept for zero-sum two-person games, the prisoner’s dilemma, the battle of sexes and games with a continuum of players.
Algorithms For The Linear Complementarity Problem Which Allow An Arbitrary Starting Point, Dolf A.J.J Talman, Ludo Van Der Heyden
Algorithms For The Linear Complementarity Problem Which Allow An Arbitrary Starting Point, Dolf A.J.J Talman, Ludo Van Der Heyden
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Schumpeterian Dynamics I. An Evolutionary Model Of Innovation And Imitation, Katsuhito Iwai
Schumpeterian Dynamics I. An Evolutionary Model Of Innovation And Imitation, Katsuhito Iwai
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
On The Infinite Welfare Cost Of Inflation And Other Second Order Effects, Christophe Chamley
On The Infinite Welfare Cost Of Inflation And Other Second Order Effects, Christophe Chamley
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The optimal inflation rate is analyzed in a simple model of intertemporal general equilibrium where agents have an operative bequest motive and taxation is distortionary. Monetary balances are used as a productive input, and agents have perfect foresight. The optimal value of the permanent inflation rate can be approximated by a simple formula. The case in which the growth of aggregate income exceeds the social discount rate is unlikely to be important, and the optimal value of the permanent inflation rate depends on the existence of a short-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation.
Approximate Equilibria With Bounds Independent Of Preferences, Robert M. Anderson, M. Ali Khan, Salim Rashid
Approximate Equilibria With Bounds Independent Of Preferences, Robert M. Anderson, M. Ali Khan, Salim Rashid
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We prove the existence of approximate equilibria in exchange economies, giving bounds on the excess demand in terms of the number of traders and norms of the endowments, but independent of the preferences.
Estimated Effects Of Relative Prices On Trade Shares, Ray C. Fair
Estimated Effects Of Relative Prices On Trade Shares, Ray C. Fair
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Arbitrage Pricing Theory In A Finite Economy, John J. Beggs
Arbitrage Pricing Theory In A Finite Economy, John J. Beggs
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Mandatory Retirement Saving And Capital Formation, Walter Dolde, James Tobin
Mandatory Retirement Saving And Capital Formation, Walter Dolde, James Tobin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Efficient Stationary Taxation And Intertemporal General Equilibrium, Christophe Chamley, Douglas Downing
Efficient Stationary Taxation And Intertemporal General Equilibrium, Christophe Chamley, Douglas Downing
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We present a method to analyze the welfare cost of price distortions created by taxes on the incomes of capital and labor and on consumption in an intertemporal model of general equilibrium. This efficiency cost depends in an important way on the production technology. It is not very sensitive to the ratio between the tax rates on capital and labor respectively, when the elasticity of substitution between these factors is small. Our method allows us to determine under the assumptions of the model, the optimal combination of taxes on capital and labor income respectively. The consumption tax is more efficient …