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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- Mechanism design (33)
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- Adverse selection (24)
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- Game theory (18)
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Articles 2191 - 2220 of 2768
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Best Uniform Approximation To Probability Densities In Econometrics, Peter C.B. Phillips
Best Uniform Approximation To Probability Densities In Econometrics, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A new method of approximating the probability density function (pdf’s) of econometric estimators and test statistics is developed. It is shown that best uniform approximants to a general class of pdf’s exist in the form of rational functions. A procedure for extracting approximants is devised and is based on modifying multiple-point Pade approximants to the distribution. The new approximation technique is very general and should be widely applicable in mathematical statistics and econometrics. It has the advantage, unlike the Edgeworth and saddlepoint approximations, of readily incorporating extraneous information on the distribution, even qualitative information. The new procedure is applied to …
Heterogeneous Information And The Theory Of The Business Cycle, Sanford Grossman, Laurence Weiss
Heterogeneous Information And The Theory Of The Business Cycle, Sanford Grossman, Laurence Weiss
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Perfect Or Robust Noncooperative Equilibrium: A Search For The Philosophers Stone?, Martin Shubik
Perfect Or Robust Noncooperative Equilibrium: A Search For The Philosophers Stone?, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Intergenerational Political Economy (A Game Theoretic Model Of How To Glue The Generations Together), Martin Shubik
Intergenerational Political Economy (A Game Theoretic Model Of How To Glue The Generations Together), Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Extension Of A Dynamical Model Of Political Equilibrium, Gerald H. Kramer
Extension Of A Dynamical Model Of Political Equilibrium, Gerald H. Kramer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Policy Responses To The Productivity Slowdown, William D. Nordhaus
Policy Responses To The Productivity Slowdown, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
A Model Of Output, Employment, Capital Formation And Inflation, R. W. Bailey, Viv B. Hall, Peter C.B. Phillips
A Model Of Output, Employment, Capital Formation And Inflation, R. W. Bailey, Viv B. Hall, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Incentive Arbitration And Time-Related Bargaining Costs, Zvi A. Livne
Incentive Arbitration And Time-Related Bargaining Costs, Zvi A. Livne
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In the context of the Nash Bargaining Problem an arbitrator is supposed to choose a solution point on the basis of ‘fairness’ requirements. By introducing time-related costs to the parties’ utility functions, a new class of arbitration changes the rules of the negotiations, and particularly the parties’ payoffs, and lets the parties negotiate. The changes are such that one or both parties are reimbursed by the arbitrator for their bargaining costs. A procedure in which only the party who makes the final concession is compensated, leads (in the case of complete information) to single dominating equilibrium strategies and to a …
The Welfare Cost Of Capital Income Taxation In A Growing Economy, Christophe Chamley
The Welfare Cost Of Capital Income Taxation In A Growing Economy, Christophe Chamley
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Linear Complementarity And The Degree Of Mappings, Roger Howe
Linear Complementarity And The Degree Of Mappings, Roger Howe
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Optimal Intertemporal Taxation And The Public Debt, Christophe Chamley
Optimal Intertemporal Taxation And The Public Debt, Christophe Chamley
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The optimal taxation problem is analyzed in a general equilibrium model of optimal growth. The private sector is represented by a single competitive household endowed with perfect foresight, and an infinite life. This household maximizes an intertemporal stationary utility function. Public consumption is financed by taxes on consumption, labor income and capital income (or wealth), or by borrowing. Different policies (first-best and second-best), are analyzed for various subsets of instruments. The problem of the optimal level of the public debt is also considered. The general conclusion supports the relative efficiency of the consumption tax with respect to the other instruments.
An Extension Of The Nash Bargaining Problem: Introducing Time-Related Bargaining Costs, Zvi A. Livne
An Extension Of The Nash Bargaining Problem: Introducing Time-Related Bargaining Costs, Zvi A. Livne
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The Nash Bargaining is reformulated by introducing time-related costs into the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions of the parties. A set of mathematical requirements on the solution is satisfied uniquely by a function called the Extended Raiffa Solution. The properties of this function are investigated. It is shown to coincide with the Nash Cooperative Solution (of a related Bargaining Problem) when the parties have identical discount rates. An interpretation of the solution and of the formal requirements is detailed. In this model the ‘bargaining power’ of the parties is determined by the bargaining costs related to the duration of the negotiations.
An Application Of The Khachianshor Algorithm To A Class Of Linear Complementary Problems, Ilan Adler, Richard P. Mclean, J. Scott Provan
An Application Of The Khachianshor Algorithm To A Class Of Linear Complementary Problems, Ilan Adler, Richard P. Mclean, J. Scott Provan
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The recent ellipsoidal method for solving linear programs due to Khachian and Shor is shown to process linear complementarity problems with positive semidefinite matrix. Suitable modifications of all lemmas are presented and it is shown that the algorithm operates in polynomial time of the same order as that required for linear programming. Thus quadratic programming problems are solvable in polynomial time.
Weakly Democratic Regular Tax Equilibria In A Local Public Goods Economy With Perfect Consumer Mobility, Donald K. Richter
Weakly Democratic Regular Tax Equilibria In A Local Public Goods Economy With Perfect Consumer Mobility, Donald K. Richter
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Output Supply, Employment, And Intra-Industry Wage Dispersion, Philip H. Dybvig, Gerald David Jaynes
Output Supply, Employment, And Intra-Industry Wage Dispersion, Philip H. Dybvig, Gerald David Jaynes
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
A Model Of U.S. Financial And Nonfinancial Economic Behavior, David Backus James Tobin, William C. Brainard, Gary Smith, James Tobin
A Model Of U.S. Financial And Nonfinancial Economic Behavior, David Backus James Tobin, William C. Brainard, Gary Smith, James Tobin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Exploitation And Class: Part Ii, Capitalist Economy, John E. Roemer
Exploitation And Class: Part Ii, Capitalist Economy, John E. Roemer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Rawlsian Justice As The Core Of A Game, John E. Roemer, Roger Howe
Rawlsian Justice As The Core Of A Game, John E. Roemer, Roger Howe
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
It is suggested that the ethical notion of social contract can be formally modeled using the well-studied concept of the core of a game. This provides a mathematical technique for studying social contracts and theories of justice. The idea is applied to Rawlsian justice here.
Inequality, Exploitation, Justice And Socialism: A Theoretical-Historical Approach, John E. Roemer
Inequality, Exploitation, Justice And Socialism: A Theoretical-Historical Approach, John E. Roemer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
A Multicountry Econometric Model, Ray C. Fair
A Multicountry Econometric Model, Ray C. Fair
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
A Multicountry Econometric Model, Ray C. Fair
A Multicountry Econometric Model, Ray C. Fair
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Some Relationships Between Discrete And Continuous Models Of An Urban Economy, Richard P. Mclean, Thomas J. Muench
Some Relationships Between Discrete And Continuous Models Of An Urban Economy, Richard P. Mclean, Thomas J. Muench
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
On The Tendency Toward Convexity Of The Vector Sum Of Sets, Roger Howe
On The Tendency Toward Convexity Of The Vector Sum Of Sets, Roger Howe
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
An Algorithm For Fiml And 3sls Estimation Of Large Nonlinear Models, William R. Parke
An Algorithm For Fiml And 3sls Estimation Of Large Nonlinear Models, William R. Parke
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper presents a numerical algorithm for computing full information maximum likelihood (FIML) and nonlinear three-stage least squares (3SLS) coefficient estimates for large nonlinear macroeconomic models. The new algorithm, which is demonstrated by actually computing FIML and 3SLS coefficient estimates for two versions of the 97 equation Fair Model, is substantially more effective than other algorithms on FIML and 3SLS estimation problems.
Morse Programs, Okitsugu Fujiwara
Morse Programs, Okitsugu Fujiwara
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
(Qvu) minimize {f(x) - uTx subject to g(x) < b + v} where f : Rn approaches R, g: Rn approaches Rm; f in C2, g in Cn; u in Rn, v in Rm; n > m; that at any local minimum point x of (Qvu) the Jacobian matrix of g at x has full rank, strict complementary slackness holds and the second order sufficiency conditions hold, for almost every matrix{u v} in Rn x Rm (Lebesgue measure). The purpose of this paper is to explicate the geometry underlying their work and to exploit this geometry in the generic analysis of constrained optimization problems. Namely we show that their work can be reduced to the study of minimizing a Morse function on a manifold with boundary. We follow …
The Spending Behavior Of Wealth- And Liquidity-Constrained Consumers, Kim Kowalewski, Gary Smith
The Spending Behavior Of Wealth- And Liquidity-Constrained Consumers, Kim Kowalewski, Gary Smith
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Competitive Bidding And Proprietary Information, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Robert J. Weber
Competitive Bidding And Proprietary Information, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Robert J. Weber
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The auction of an object is considered, for the case in which one bidder is better-informed than the others concerning the actual value of the object. An equilibrium point solution of the competitive bidding game is determined; at this equilibrium, the expected revenue of the less-well-informed bidders is zero. The case of an object which can take only values from a discrete set is dealt with as the limit of auctions of continuously-valued objects.
“On The Relation Of Various Reliability Measures To Each Other And To Game Theoretic Values, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, David R. Strip
“On The Relation Of Various Reliability Measures To Each Other And To Game Theoretic Values, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, David R. Strip
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A variety of measures have recently been proposed for measuring the relative importance of individual components in the overall reliability of a system. Several of these seemingly different measures are very closely related under the conditions typically assumed in the reliability literature. The measures are also closely related to the probabilistic values of game theory; although the game theoretic literature predates the reliability literature by up to two decades, the similarities have apparently not been previously observed or exploited.
Tax-Based Incomes Policies: A Better Mousetrap?, William D. Nordhaus
Tax-Based Incomes Policies: A Better Mousetrap?, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
The Design Of Distributed Service Systems, David R. Strip, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
The Design Of Distributed Service Systems, David R. Strip, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A variety of practical situations involve supplying a particular commodity by some locations to satisfy the demand at others. If the demands and the costs of producing varying amounts of commodity at each location are known, then the question is how much commodity should be supplied by each location in order to minimize the total system cost. Under some relatively general conditions, there will be an optimal solution with the property that the vector of amounts supplied by the various locations is one of a distinguished set of points. In the case of star networks, this combinatorial nature may be …