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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Folklore Theorems, Implicit Maps And New Unit Root Limit Theory, Peter C.B. Phillips Jan 2011

Folklore Theorems, Implicit Maps And New Unit Root Limit Theory, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

The delta method and continuous mapping theorem are among the most extensively used tools in asymptotic derivations in econometrics. Extensions of these methods are provided for sequences of functions, which are commonly encountered in applications, and where the usual methods sometimes fail. Important examples of failure arise in the use of simulation based estimation methods such as indirect inference. The paper explores the application of these methods to the indirect inference estimator (IIE) in first order autoregressive estimation. The IIE uses a binding function that is sample size dependent. Its limit theory relies on a sequence-based delta method in the …


Specification Testing For Nonlinear Cointegrating Regression, Qiying Wang, Peter C.B. Phillips Jan 2011

Specification Testing For Nonlinear Cointegrating Regression, Qiying Wang, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We provide a limit theory for a general class of kernel smoothed U statistics that may be used for specification testing in time series regression with nonstationary data. The framework allows for linear and nonlinear models of cointegration and regressors that have autoregressive unit roots or near unit roots. The limit theory for the specification test depends on the self intersection local time of a Gaussian process. A new weak convergence result is developed for certain partial sums of functions involving nonstationary time series that converges to the intersection local time process. This result is of independent interest and useful …


Efficient Search By Committee, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki Jan 2011

Efficient Search By Committee, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard utilitarian welfare criterion. Furthermore, the mechanism can be modified to have a balanced budget.


First Difference Mle And Dynamic Panel Estimation, Chirok Han, Peter C.B. Phillips Jan 2011

First Difference Mle And Dynamic Panel Estimation, Chirok Han, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

First difference maximum likelihood (FDML) seems an attractive estimation methodology in dynamic panel data modeling because differencing eliminates fixed effects and, in the case of a unit root, differencing transforms the data to stationarity, thereby addressing both incidental parameter problems and the possible effects of nonstationarity. This paper draws attention to certain pathologies that arise in the use of FDML that have gone unnoticed in the literature and that affect both finite sample peformance and asymptotics. FDML uses the Gaussian likelihood function for first differenced data and parameter estimation is based on the whole domain over which the log-likelihood is …


Mechanism Design With Limited Information: The Case Of Nonlinear Pricing, Dirk Bergemann, Ji Shen, Yun Xu, Edmund M. Yeh Nov 2010

Mechanism Design With Limited Information: The Case Of Nonlinear Pricing, Dirk Bergemann, Ji Shen, Yun Xu, Edmund M. Yeh

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We analyze the canonical nonlinear pricing model with limited information. A seller offers a menu with a finite number of choices to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. By revealing an underlying connection to quantization theory, we derive the optimal finite menu for the socially efficient and the revenue-maximizing mechanism. In both cases, we provide an estimate of the loss resulting from the usage of a finite n-class menu. We show that the losses converge to zero at a rate proportional to 1/n2 asn becomes large.


Revealed Preferences For Risk And Ambiguity, Donald J. Brown, Chandra Erdman, Kirsten Ling, Laurie Santos Nov 2010

Revealed Preferences For Risk And Ambiguity, Donald J. Brown, Chandra Erdman, Kirsten Ling, Laurie Santos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We replicate the essentials of the Huettel et al. (2006) experiment on choice under uncertainty with 30 Yale undergraduates, where subjects make 200 pair-wise choices between risky and ambiguous lotteries. Inferences about the independence of economic preferences for risk and ambiguity are derived from estimation of a mixed logit model, where the choice probabilities are functions of two random effects: the proxies for risk-aversion and ambiguity-aversion. [Our principal empirical finding is that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that risk and ambiguity are independent in economic choice under uncertainty. This finding is consistent with the hypothesized independence of the neural …


Estimation And Inference With Weak, Semi-Strong, And Strong Identification, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xu Cheng Oct 2010

Estimation And Inference With Weak, Semi-Strong, And Strong Identification, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xu Cheng

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

This paper analyzes the properties of standard estimators, tests, and confidence sets (CS’s) in a class of models in which the parameters are unidentified or weakly identified in some parts of the parameter space. The paper also introduces methods to make the tests and CS’s robust to such identification problems. The results apply to a class of extremum estimators and corresponding tests and CS’s, including maximum likelihood (ML), least squares (LS), quantile, generalized method of moments (GMM), generalized empirical likelihood (GEL), minimum distance (MD), and semi-parametric estimators. The consistency/lack-of-consistency and asymptotic distributions of the estimators are established under a full …


Interdependent Preferences And Strategic Distinguishability, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi Sep 2010

Interdependent Preferences And Strategic Distinguishability, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent’s (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent’s preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional preferences; and so on. Two types are said to be strategically indistinguishable if they have an equilibrium action in common in any mechanism that they play. We show that two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they have the same preference hierarchy. We examine how this result extends to alternative solution concepts and strategic relations between types.


Interdependent Preferences And Strategic Distinguishability, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi Sep 2010

Interdependent Preferences And Strategic Distinguishability, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent’s (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent’s preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional preferences; and so on. Two types are said to be strategically indistinguishable if they have an equilibrium action in common in any mechanism that they play. We show that two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they have the same preference hierarchy. We examine how this result extends to alternative solution concepts and strategic relations between types.


Semiparametric Estimation In Time Series Of Simultaneous Equations, Jiti Gao, Peter C.B. Phillips Sep 2010

Semiparametric Estimation In Time Series Of Simultaneous Equations, Jiti Gao, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A system of vector semiparametric nonlinear time series models is studied with possible dependence structures and nonstationarities in the parametric and nonparametric components. The parametric regressors may be endogenous while the nonparametric regressors are strictly exogenous and represent trends. The parametric regressors may be stationary or nonstationary and the nonparametric regressors are nonstationary time series. This framework allows for the nonparametric treatment of stochastic trends and subsumes many practical cases. Semiparametric least squares (SLS) estimation is considered and its asymptotic properties are derived. Due to endogeneity in the parametric regressors, SLS is generally inconsistent for the parametric component and a …


Interdependent Preferences And Strategic Distinguishability, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi Sep 2010

Interdependent Preferences And Strategic Distinguishability, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We identify a universal type space of possible interdependent (expected utility) preferences of a group of agents satisfying two criteria. First, a type consists of a “detail free” description, in a natural language, of the agents’ interdependent preferences. Second, distinct types in the universal type space must be “strategically distinguishable” in the sense that there must exist a mechanism where those types are guaranteed to behave differently in equilibrium. Our results generalize and unify results of Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) (who characterized strategic distinguishability on fixed finite type spaces) and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006), (2007) (who characterized strategic distinguishability …


Nonlinear Cointegrating Regression Under Weak Identification, Xiaoxia Shi, Peter C.B. Phillips Sep 2010

Nonlinear Cointegrating Regression Under Weak Identification, Xiaoxia Shi, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

An asymptotic theory is developed for a weakly identified cointegrating regression model in which the regressor is a nonlinear transformation of an integrated process. Weak identification arises from the presence of a loading coefficient for the nonlinear function that may be close to zero. In that case, standard nonlinear cointegrating limit theory does not provide good approximations to the finite sample distributions of nonlinear least squares estimators, resulting in potentially misleading inference. A new local limit theory is developed that approximates the finite sample distributions of the estimators uniformly well irrespective of the strength of the identification. An important technical …


The Mysteries Of Trend, Peter C.B. Phillips Sep 2010

The Mysteries Of Trend, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Trends are ubiquitous in economic discourse, play a role in much economic theory, and have been intensively studied in econometrics over the last three decades. Yet the empirical economist, forecaster, and policy maker have little guidance from theory about the source and nature of trend behavior, even less guidance about practical formulations, and are heavily reliant on a limited class of stochastic trend, deterministic drift, and structural break models to use in applications. A vast econometric literature has emerged but the nature of trend remains elusive. In spite of being the dominant characteristic in much economic data, having a role …


Interdependent Preferences And Strategic Distinguishability, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi Sep 2010

Interdependent Preferences And Strategic Distinguishability, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We study agents whose expected utility preferences are interdependent for informational or psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be “strategically distinguished” in the sense that they are guaranteed to behave differently in some finite mechanism. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they have different hierarchies of interdependent preferences. The same characterization applies for rationalizability, equilibrium, and any interim solution concept in between. Our results generalize and unify results of Abreu and Matsushima (1992), who characterize strategic distinguishability on fixed finite type spaces, and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006), (2007), who characterize strategic …


Dating The Timeline Of Financial Bubbles During The Subprime Crisis, Peter C.B. Phillips, Jun Yu Sep 2010

Dating The Timeline Of Financial Bubbles During The Subprime Crisis, Peter C.B. Phillips, Jun Yu

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A new recursive regression methodology is introduced to analyze the bubble characteristics of various financial time series during the subprime crisis. The methods modify a technique proposed in Phillips, Wu and Yu (2010) and provide a technology for identifying bubble behavior and consistent dating of their origination and collapse. The tests also serve as an early warning diagnostic of bubble activity. Seven relevant financial series are investigated, including three financial assets (the Nasdaq index, home price index and asset-backed commercial paper), two commodities (the crude oil price and platinum price), one bond rate (Baa), and one exchange rate (Pound/USD). Statistically …


Identifying Finite Mixtures In Econometric Models, Marc Henry, Yuichi Kitamura, Bernard Salanié Sep 2010

Identifying Finite Mixtures In Econometric Models, Marc Henry, Yuichi Kitamura, Bernard Salanié

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We consider partial identification of finite mixture models in the presence of an observable source of variation in the mixture weights that leaves component distributions unchanged, as is the case in large classes of econometric models. We first show that when the number J of component distributions is known a priori, the family of mixture models compatible with the data is a subset of a J ( J – 1)-dimensional space. When the outcome variable is continuous, this subset is defined by linear constraints which we characterize exactly. Our identifying assumption has testable implications which we spell out for J …


Mediation And Peace, Johannes Hörner, Massimo Morelli, Francesco Squintani Aug 2010

Mediation And Peace, Johannes Hörner, Massimo Morelli, Francesco Squintani

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

This paper brings mechanism design to the study of conflict resolution in international relations. We determine when and how unmediated communication and mediation reduce the ex ante probability of conflict, in a simple game where conflict is due to asymmetric information. Unmediated communication helps reducing the chance of conflict as it allows conflicting parties to reveal their types and establish type-dependent transfers to avoid conflict. Mediation improves upon unmediated communication when the intensity of conflict is high, or when asymmetric information is large. The mediator improves upon unmediated communication by not precisely reporting information to conflicting parties, and precisely, by …


Should Auctions Be Transparent?, Dirk Bergemann, Johannes Hörner Aug 2010

Should Auctions Be Transparent?, Dirk Bergemann, Johannes Hörner

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with private and independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time. We analyze the first-price auction under three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. Of particular interest is the minimal disclosure regime, in which each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction at the end of each round. In equilibrium, the winner of the initial auction lowers his bids over time, while losers keep their bids constant, in anticipation of the winner’s …


History-Disappointment Risk Attitude, David Dillenberger, Kareen Rozen Aug 2010

History-Disappointment Risk Attitude, David Dillenberger, Kareen Rozen

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We propose a model of history-dependent risk attitude, allowing a decision maker’s risk attitude to be affected by his history of disappointments and elations. The decision maker recursively evaluates compound risks, classifying realizations as disappointing or elating using a threshold rule. We establish equivalence between the model and two cognitive biases: risk attitudes are reinforced by experiences (one is more risk averse after disappointment than after elation) and there is a primacy effect (early outcomes have the greatest impact on risk attitude). In dynamic asset pricing, the model yields volatile, path-dependent prices.


The Value Of Luminosity Data As A Proxy For Economic Statistics, Xi Chen, William D. Nordhaus Aug 2010

The Value Of Luminosity Data As A Proxy For Economic Statistics, Xi Chen, William D. Nordhaus

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

One of the pervasive issues in social and environmental research has been to improve the quality of socioeconomic data in developing countries. Because of the shortcoming of standard data sources, the present study examines luminosity (measures of nighttime lights) as a proxy for standard measures of output. The paper compares output and luminosity at the country levels and at the 1° x 1° grid-cell levels for the period 1992-2008. The results are that luminosity has very little value added for countries with high-quality statistical systems. However, it may be useful for countries with the lowest statistical grades, particularly for war-torn …


Should Auctions Be Transparent?, Dirk Bergemann, Johannes Hörner Aug 2010

Should Auctions Be Transparent?, Dirk Bergemann, Johannes Hörner

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with independent private and persistent values. We analyze three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. In the minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation is efficient and the minimal disclosure regime does not give rise to pooling equilibria. In contrast, in disclosure settings where either all or only the winner’s bids are public, an inefficient pooling equilibrium with low revenues exists.


Should Auctions Be Transparent?, Dirk Bergemann, Johannes Hörner Aug 2010

Should Auctions Be Transparent?, Dirk Bergemann, Johannes Hörner

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with independent private and persistent values. We analyze three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. In the minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation is efficient and the minimal disclosure regime does not give rise to pooling equilibria. In contrast, in disclosure settings where either all or only the winner’s bids are public, an inefficient pooling equilibrium with low revenues exists.


Why Does Bad News Increase Volatility And Decrease Leverage?, Ana Fostel, John Geanakoplos Jul 2010

Why Does Bad News Increase Volatility And Decrease Leverage?, Ana Fostel, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A recent literature shows how an increase in volatility reduces leverage. However, in order to explain pro-cyclical leverage it assumes that bad news increases volatility, that is, it assumes an inverse relationship between first and second moments of asset returns. This paper suggests a reason why bad news is more often than not associated with higher future volatility. We show that, in a model with endogenous leverage and heterogeneous beliefs, agents have the incentive to invest mostly in technologies that become more volatile in bad times. Agents choose these technologies because they can be leveraged more during normal times. Together …


Why Does Bad News Increase Volatility And Decrease Leverage?, Ana Fostel, John Geanakoplos Jul 2010

Why Does Bad News Increase Volatility And Decrease Leverage?, Ana Fostel, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

The literature on leverage until now shows how an increase in volatility reduces leverage. However, in order to explain pro-cyclical leverage it assumes that bad news increases volatility. This paper suggests a reason why bad news is more often than not associated with higher future volatility. We show that, in a model with endogenous leverage and heterogeneous beliefs, agents have the incentive to invest mostly in technologies that become volatile in bad times. Together with the old literature this explains pro-cyclical leverage. The result also gives rationale to the pattern of volatility smiles observed in the stock options since 1987. …


Why Does Bad News Increase Volatility And Decrease Leverage?, Ana Fostel, John Geanakoplos Jul 2010

Why Does Bad News Increase Volatility And Decrease Leverage?, Ana Fostel, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A recent literature shows how an increase in volatility reduces leverage. However, in order to explain pro-cyclical leverage it assumes that bad news increases volatility, that is, it assumes an inverse relationship between first and second moments of asset returns. This paper suggests a reason why bad news is more often than not associated with higher future volatility. We show that, in a model with endogenous leverage and heterogeneous beliefs, agents have the incentive to invest mostly in technologies that become more volatile in bad times. Agents choose these technologies because they can be leveraged more during normal times. Together …


Estimation And Inference With Weak, Semi-Strong, And Strong Identification, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xu Cheng Jun 2010

Estimation And Inference With Weak, Semi-Strong, And Strong Identification, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xu Cheng

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

This paper analyzes the properties of standard estimators, tests, and confidence sets (CS’s) for parameters that are unidentified or weakly identified in some parts of the parameter space. The paper also introduces methods to make the tests and CS’s robust to such identification problems. The results apply to a class of extremum estimators and corresponding tests and CS’s that are based on criterion functions that satisfy certain asymptotic stochastic quadratic expansions and that depend on the parameter that determines the strength of identification. This covers a class of models estimated using maximum likelihood (ML), least squares (LS), quantile, generalized method …


Inference Based On Conditional Moment Inequalities, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xiaoxia Shi Jun 2010

Inference Based On Conditional Moment Inequalities, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xiaoxia Shi

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

In this paper, we propose an instrumental variable approach to constructing confidence sets (CS’s) for the true parameter in models defined by conditional moment inequalities/equalities. We show that by properly choosing instrument functions, one can transform conditional moment inequalities/equalities into unconditional ones without losing identification power. Based on the unconditional moment inequalities/equalities, we construct CS’s by inverting Cramér-von Mises-type or Kolmogorov-Smirnov-type tests. Critical values are obtained using generalized moment selection (GMS) procedures. We show that the proposed CS’s have correct uniform asymptotic coverage probabilities. New methods are required to establish these results because an infinite-dimensional nuisance parameter affects the asymptotic …


Inference Based On Conditional Moment Inequalities, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xiaoxia Shi Jun 2010

Inference Based On Conditional Moment Inequalities, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xiaoxia Shi

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

In this paper, we propose an instrumental variable approach to constructing confidence sets (CS’s) for the true parameter in models defined by conditional moment inequalities/equalities. We show that by properly choosing instrument functions, one can transform conditional moment inequalities/equalities into unconditional ones without losing identification power. Based on the unconditional moment inequalities/equalities, we construct CS’s by inverting Cramér–von Mises-type or Kolmogorov–Smirnov-type tests. Critical values are obtained using generalized moment selection (GMS) procedures. We show that the proposed CS’s have correct uniform asymptotic coverage probabilities. New methods are required to establish these results because an infinite-dimensional nuisance parameter affects the asymptotic …


Inference Based On Conditional Moment Inequalities, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xiaoxia Shi Jun 2010

Inference Based On Conditional Moment Inequalities, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xiaoxia Shi

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

In this paper, we propose an instrumental variable approach to constructing confidence sets (CS’s) for the true parameter in models defined by conditional moment inequalities/equalities. We show that by properly choosing instrument functions, one can transform conditional moment inequalities/equalities into unconditional ones without losing identification power. Based on the unconditional moment inequalities/equalities, we construct CS’s by inverting Cramér-von Mises-type or Kolmogorov-Smirnov-type tests. Critical values are obtained using generalized moment selection (GMS) procedures. We show that the proposed CS’s have correct uniform asymptotic coverage probabilities. New methods are required to establish these results because an infinite-dimensional nuisance parameter affects the asymptotic …


The Role Of Commitment In Bilateral Trade, Dino Gerardi, Johannes Hörner, Lucas Maestri May 2010

The Role Of Commitment In Bilateral Trade, Dino Gerardi, Johannes Hörner, Lucas Maestri

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

This paper solves for the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers, as discounting vanishes. The seller of a good is informed of its quality, which affects both his cost and the buyer’s valuation, but the buyer is not. To characterize this payoff set, we derive an upper bound, using mechanism design with limited commitment. We then prove that this upper bound is tight, by showing that all its extreme points are equilibrium payoffs. Our results shed light on the role of different forms of commitment on the bargaining process. In …